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THE PRAETORIAN STATE IN THE ARAB SPRING† 
KHALED ABOU EL FADL* 
First, I have to say that it is always emotional to come back to 
the place where you studied.  I graduated from Penn Law School, 
and although a lot has changed in the school since then, my years 
at Penn were amazing.  I actually joined UCLA when the Dean of 
UCLA Law School was from Penn as well.  So Penn graduates, law 
school graduates, perhaps there is a future career for you in 
teaching law.  But, moving along from the sentimentalities of law 
school and legal education to a different type of sentimentality, I 
think. 
The bulk of my comments today will be on the Egyptian 
revolution as a case study, while making a variety of notes on the 
other revolutions taking place in the region.  There is a rich body of 
literature for those who read in this field on the sociology and the 
political theories of revolution: When do revolutions occur?  What 
revolutions tend to succeed?  What revolutions tend to not 
succeed?  And especially in this literature, there are attempts to 
theorize what types of revolutions under what conditions produce 
successful and stable democracies.  Theda Skocpol and Barrington 
Moore for example, and many others, wrote quite influential works 
in this field.1   
                                                     
† This essay is based on the transcription of the keynote lecture of Dr. Khaled 
Abou El Fadl at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 
Symposium entitled “Democracy in the Middle East,” delivered on November 11, 
2011. 
* Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Professor in Islamic Law at the 
UCLA School of Law.  Dr. Abou El Fadl also holds the Chair in Islam and 
Citizenship at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands. 
1 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES & SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, & CHINA (1979) (examining the causes and outcomes 
of the 1789 French Revolution, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911 ); THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 
(1994) (a collection of essays updating Skocpol’s earlier work by examining 
dozens of armed insurrections occurring since 1956, and identifying the 
ingredients that make regimes more or less susceptible to revolution); 
BARRINGTON MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND 
PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1st Edition ed. 1993) (1966) 
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However, the literature on what one might call subaltern, post-
colonial societies, and revolutions occurring in these types of 
societies, is not nearly as rich—in fact, it is quite impoverished.  As 
a result, quite a bit of what we do is in the category of commentary, 
rather than engaging systematic analytical paradigms through 
which we try to draw some principles to understand which 
revolutions produce what and why. 
One of the significant factors in the revolutions that have taken 
place in the Middle East is what a political scientist Amos 
Perlmutter once called the “Praetorian State,” which means 
basically militarized societies, or states where there is a large 
military, and the military is not, so-to-speak, in the barracks.2  
Rather, the military has become part of the bureaucratic state and a 
substantial force in creating the middle class.  It also signifies the 
rootedness of the military in the administrative structure as well as 
the oppressive powers of the state.  Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, 
and other countries, including those that some have termed 
subaltern nation states, fit within exactly that description—where 
the military is like an octopus that has its tentacles in various 
aspects.   
In the Egyptian context, for instance, it is well known that most 
governors are ex-military, and most mayors are ex-military.  In 
fact, part of the infrastructure of the country is the expectation that 
after spending twenty or so years in the military, upon retirement 
the government will appoint you, not just as a governor or a mayor 
(which after all constitute a limited numbers of posts) but even 
appoint you on the boards of private companies.  I could give you a 
million examples, but just one example, I think, will make the 
point. 
There is a very successful company in Egypt called Oriental 
Weavers that makes rugs, and it is one of the few companies in 
Egypt that actually exports a good part of its products, including to 
the United States.  And quite typical of numerous businesses in 
countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and so on, is that retired 
army officers are on the board of directors, and in fact, are even 
                                                                                                                        
(arguing that a political order becomes democratic vis-à-vis fascist and communist 
dictatorships depending on whether the revolution, which all societies undergo, 
originates in the landed aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, or the peasantry). 
2 See AMOS PERLMUTTER, EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE (1974) (depicting 
Nasser’s regime, where the political leadership of the ruling class emerges from 
the ranks of the army, against the backdrop of praetorian political systems 
generally). 
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managers at various levels.  When you talk to the people who run 
these businesses, it is quite clear why they hire or accept “the 
recommendation” to appoint retired army officers—because they 
do not want to clash with the state.  It is a part of the cost of 
business.  If you receive a friendly suggestion that you should 
appoint General such and such to your board of directors, or give 
them some managerial position, it takes a suicidal soul to say no.  
This is part of the reality that the revolutions—whether in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Syria, Yemen—have to confront and deal with. 
As I will elaborate later, this Praetorian State structure turns 
out to be significant in a variety of ways, but one of the most 
important aspects is the culture of these militarized 
bureaucracies—or bureaucratic military—that becomes a part of 
the very mechanics of the state itself.  The military is a frequent 
topic of discussion after the Egyptian revolution.  Its primary role 
is not to fight wars, and not even to expect to fight wars, but to run 
the country.  And part of the military creed (al-’aqīda al-’askariyya) 
that is explicitly and openly taught in military schools—whether in 
Egypt, Syria, or Tunisia—is that it is only the military mind that is 
incorruptible and that can achieve concrete results.  Therefore, part 
of the military’s ideological makeup is the expectation that it is 
essential, not to defending the country, but to running the country.  
And here the expression that one often hears repeated after 
revolutions—“when is the military going to return to the 
barracks,” or “when is the military going to be limited to the 
barracks”—becomes rather complicated because the military has 
never really been limited to the barracks in the first place. 
Importantly, the military is ideologically rooted, in a 
complicated way, in two distinct cultures.  Perhaps, of course, real 
specialists will tell you that the military is rooted in multiple 
cultures, but two main cultures concern me and are important for 
this discussion.  First, the military is rooted in the general 
cumulative, inherited Islamic culture that the rest of society 
shares—but not fully.  Second, as the expression goes, “one foot is 
rooted in that shared culture with the rest of society, while another 
foot is rooted in a unique subculture of the military creed,” or what 
they call al-’aqīda al-’askariyya.  Al-’aqīda literally means “belief,” or 
a system of belief; so the second culture is that unique subculture, 
or the system of belief that the military teaches. 
I will recount my personal experience with the Egyptian 
revolution and tie it into my broader comments about the military 
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and the complexity of its role and potential effect on the so called 
Arab Spring.   
Of course, like most people who are Egyptian, my reaction 
after the Egyptian revolution was sheer jubilation.  I do not get 
very excited too often in life, but the day Mubarak stepped down, I 
was excited.  I cracked a smile.  Now, of course, if you observe the 
Tunisian revolution and then the Egyptian revolution, you are 
struck by several things.  You are struck by the reluctance (and the 
initial reluctance even in the Libyan revolution) of the populace to 
resort to violence.  In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, there is even a 
commitment and dedication not to respond with violence.  There is 
an attempt to hold on to what one can call a myth that the 
populace and the military are united.  In the Egyptian expression, 
as the demonstrators would often yell out, “Al-sha’b wa gaysh īd 
wahda,”—that the people and the army are one hand.  And, of 
course, people use this rallying cry to appeal to the army not to use 
violence against the demonstrators.  It did not go very far in Libya, 
it did not go anywhere in Yemen, and it did not go anywhere in 
Bahrain, although in all of these revolutions, that slogan was 
attempted.  It was successful to an extent in Tunisia and Egypt. 
But at the same time, there is this rallying cry; it is mixed with 
expressions that would appear remarkably radical to those who 
thought Islamic societies are static and despotic.  Many of the 
campaigns and slogans spoke clearly of liberty and dignity, and 
spoke of them as God-given rights.  And as some of you might 
remember, many of the rallying cries during these revolutions 
used expressions like, “Allāhu Akbar,” God is great.  There is a 
whole fascinating discourse about martyrdom that deserves its 
own study—wherein referring to the many of those who joined the 
revolution and were killed, the discourse was steeped in 
theological paradigms of martyrdom.  For example, a friend of 
mine woke up and told his mother, “I’m going to become a 
martyr,” and kissed everyone in his family goodbye, saying, 
“Don’t be sad for me, I’m going to be martyred.”  Of course it is 
fascinating that martyrdom means being killed while engaging in 
peaceful demonstrations and peaceful resistance, and not while 
engaging in any violent activity.  Furthermore, whether in the 
Egyptian or Tunisian or Libyan context, the theology of jihad was 
used quite heavily.  Here, jihad is the idea that one is engaged in a 
struggle that is ultimately favorable in God’s eye, and that if one is 
killed during the struggle, he or she dies a martyr. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/1
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In the midst of all of this, one might notice a worrisome factor.  
One of the images of the Egyptian revolution was that of 
multitudes of people on a bridge, attempting to pray while being 
sprayed with water.  Or, take for example, the various images of 
people attempting to perform their prayers while being attacked 
by security forces, or run over by cars.  In the case of Libya and 
Yemen, there was the bombardment of mosques.  These images 
underscored—and this again reflects many of the discourses that I 
have heard and engaged in after the revolution in Egypt—the 
extent to which the military and security forces are steeped in the 
same notion of religious sanctities (ḥurumāt).  It is a critical 
sociological concept that the military and the security forces have a 
different notion of ḥurumāt or religious sanctities than the 
populace.  The fact that the military would attack people in prayer, 
or would attack a mosque, or kill some of the prominent, well-
respected religious leaders in demonstrations, was a reminder that 
the military, very much like the military during the colonial age 
and shortly after the post-colonial age, is of a different cultural 
orientation than the populace which it rules.  There is a substantial 
body of literature on this point, but the revolutions served as a 
very stark reminder. 
Now, at some point after the initial euphoria, which I felt in the 
United States, my jubilation put me on a plane to Egypt.  I reached 
Egypt after Mubārak had stepped down, but when there were still 
various demonstrations in Tahrir Square taking place.  At that 
time, there were regular demonstrations to affirm and consolidate 
the revolution, and to make sure that the revolution was not 
usurped.   
One of the most notable things about not just the Egyptian 
revolution, but also the Tunisian, the Yemeni, and the Syrian 
revolutions, was the critical role of Friday congregational prayers.  
Nearly every major demonstration was organized around Friday 
prayer, and usually the Imam would give a fiery sermon about 
liberty and freedom and the centrality of liberty and freedom to 
God’s law.  After the Friday sermons, the demonstrations would 
take place.   
In that context, while I was in Egypt, I had the opportunity to 
observe firsthand another critical development.  Initially in Egypt, 
there was great disappointment with the position of al-Azhar (the 
major religious institution in Egypt) vis-à-vis the revolution—
basically, its silence.  Sometime in June 2011, the Shaykh of al-
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Azhar3 announced an initiative to meet with intellectuals of all 
orientations—leftists, right-wing groups, Marxists, and Islamists—
to produce what would later on become known as wathīqat al-
Azhar, or the “Azhar Declaration.”4  This was a very important 
document in the history of Islamic theology and Islamic law, and it 
produced a variety of reactions.  After meeting for about two 
months, everyone present signed on to the Azhar Declaration.  I 
will only highlight some of the most important points here.   
First, the Azhar Declaration underscored a particular line of 
reformers in Islām.  It named people like Ḥasan al-Aṭṭār, Rifā’a al-
Ṭahṭāwī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī, ‘Abdullah 
Darrāz, and Maḥmūd Shaltūt.  It emphasized that there are shared 
principles between those who work with Islamic commitments and 
those who work with secular principles, or even atheistic 
principles, and called them “common goals.”  It stated that these 
common goals are so anchored in Islamic theology that it is the 
obligation of a Muslim to work towards these common goals and 
ignore the differences.  What were these common goals?   
The document included about eleven principles; this is not an 
exhaustive list but among the most important were:  
1) that Islām does not know theocracy;  
2) that Islām rejects a theocratic state;  
3) that Islām mandates a national constitutional democratic 
state; 
4) that the constitution must be drawn by the people and 
represent the will of the people; 
5) that Islām affirms rights and obligations, and importantly, 
refers to international human rights treaties as unequivocally 
affirmed by Islām and quintessential to Islamic theology; 
6) that people have an absolute right to run and administer 
their countries, and have an absolute right to free elections, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of belief; and 
7) that it is a sin to call someone a traitor or kāfir (infidel) in 
Islam. 
                                                     
3 The Shaykh of al-Azhar is a very influential religious position, akin to the 
grand Imam, or the equivalent of the Pope in a Muslim context. 
4 See al-Azhar Declaration on the Future of Egypt, OFFICE OF THE GRAND 
IMAM, AL-AZHAR AL SHARIF (June 2011), available at 
http://www.bibalex.org/Attachments/english/elazhar.pdf.   
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This declaration was signed in June 2011, and seemed like 
nothing short of an historic event.  Its signing was covered by 
numerous newspapers and magazines.  Of course, the Western 
media largely ignored it, but its impact within the politics of the 
region was significant, often in rather surprising ways.   
At that time, there seemed to be two parties that were distinctly 
unhappy with the Declaration of Azhar (wathīqat al-Azhar).  The 
first perhaps is not surprising: the party of Wahhābī Islām, or 
Saudi-backed Islām, whom I refer to as the puritans in my 
writings.5  On one Friday, they held a two-million-man march to 
demonstrate their power and to denounce the Declaration of Azhar 
as a corruption and heretical document.  They called for the 
expulsion of the Shaykh of al-Azhar, Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib.  This 
display, in turn, resulted in a counter-two-million-man march to 
demonstrate the power of the counterforce to the puritans. 
The second group that became quite unhappy with the 
Declaration of Azhar was the military.  What I witnessed from that 
point on was a fascinating process, by which, to put it bluntly, 
Saudi Arabia came out quite in the open about its support of 
puritanical groups and what it considers to be its stand or defense 
against the corruptions of liberal Azharī Islām.  At the popular 
level, mainstream Egyptians did not consider the Declaration of 
Azhar to be at all novel.  Especially in August 2011 and into 
September, the military, in confronting the appearance of the 
puritanical groups, seemed to become more and more stubborn in 
granting concessions to the revolutionary forces in Egypt.   
Just to provide some broad outlines, initially in June, the 
military announced that it was willing to meet with all Egyptian 
intellectuals for discussions about the future of Egypt.  In the first 
meetings we attended, certain generals would basically lecture us 
about democracy and government, to which we objected.  We then 
had a few sessions where there actually was some give and take.  
After the Declaration of Azhar, what increasingly became the party 
line represented by the military was: you people—meaning the 
intellectuals and the people who support the Egyptian 
revolution—do not know how dangerous our region is.  You do 
not understand the dangers posed by the puritanical Islamic 
groups.  You do not understand the dangers posed by an 
independent Azhar (greater independence for al-Azhar was one of 
                                                     
5 See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE 
EXTREMISTS (2005) for a detailed discussion on Wahhābī Islām. 
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the principles that the Declaration demanded).  You do not 
understand the dangers of being drawn into a war with Israel. 
One of the issues at the time was the so-called “oil deal,” under 
which Egypt would export oil to Israel at prices far below the 
market, and one of the revolutionary demands was the 
renegotiation of that contract.  There are many stories of 
corruptions and payoffs in conjunction with this oil deal, in which I 
suspect some of the military to be involved.  But, while in June we 
were told that we could discuss the oil deal and that an elected 
government could renegotiate the terms, in August we were 
solemnly informed that any attempt to renegotiate the terms 
would lead to Israel waging war on Egypt, and therefore it must 
remain untouchable.   
The list of untouchables seemed to increase, until we reached a 
point where the military said, “Yes, we are willing to transition to 
democracy; however, there are high state interests (maṣāliḥ ‘ulyā)—
such as the army, Camp David, many business issues, the position 
of America, and the relationship with Saudi Arabia—that cannot 
be left to the vagaries of the democratic process.”6  Here we are left 
with a basic fundamental question, which I actually posed to one 
of the generals: if these are high state interests that cannot be left to 
an autonomous democratic process, and must be guaranteed by 
the military, how much space is left for a democracy? 
In fact, one of the things that has developed—and this reflects 
the current reality in Egypt—is that you can write articles and you 
can criticize God.  You can speak profanely about Islām and 
Sharī’a.  But you cannot criticize the military.  There are currently 
about 6,000 people who are undergoing military trials in Egypt 
because they have written things that are perceived to be critical of 
the military or that question the position or the privileges of the 
military.  So how much space is left for a democracy to work in?  
What does it mean to speak of a democratic revolution in a 
praetorian state; in a state in which the military has become its own 
monstrous interest?   
The military is a possessor of sacred knowledge.  It is a 
possessor of that knowledge which it calls high national interests—
knowledge as to a special relationship with Israel, with the United 
                                                     
6 The military informed us that this is the position of the United States, and 
that the United States informed the military that the military must guarantee 
certain non-negotiable interests such as certain privileges for the American 
military in Egypt and Camp David, as well as some other interests that I am 
restricted from mentioning. 
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States, with China, or with Saudi Arabia—and it becomes a form of 
sacrilege to attempt to open up these issues for discussion or for 
renegotiation.  Of course, this situation is not entirely new or novel.  
We all too often forget that there was a similar revolutionary 
constitutional movement at the beginning of the twentieth century 
in Iran.  There was another constitutional revolution at the 
beginning of the twentieth century in Egypt.  And ultimately, these 
revolutions were aborted by the military, whether the national 
military on its own, or the national military with foreign aid. 
In raising these issues, I am not trying to end on a pessimistic 
note.  What I am saying is that understanding revolutionary 
movements and democracy is not as simple as studying whether 
there is a merchant class or a strong middle class, or whether the 
religious institution is cooperating or not cooperating.  One of the 
things that you quickly confront in the Middle East is the extent to 
which the region itself is permeated with claims of various 
interests of various powers, and this has become a true 
mythology—a mythology that you cannot unpack.  For example, 
there were so many times in meetings with the military when we 
were told, “if you are not careful, Saudi Arabia is ready to 
bankrupt us.  If you do not modify the Azharī language about 
liberal Islām, Saudi Arabia will withdraw X amount of money from 
Egypt and the Egyptian economy will collapse.”  That is a 
mythology that people on the ground have to negotiate, often 
under horrendous conditions.   
When I left Egypt, at least four or five of those who used to 
attend those meetings with me ended up in prison, subject to 
military trials (one has since been released).  The expected sentence 
is a three- to six-year prison term for each of them.  Why?  I do not 
know; no one knows.  But my sincere hope is that there will be 
more honesty in our discourse about the real problems that 
confront us on the ground when we talk about the establishment of 
a democratic order. 
My expectation, especially as to Egypt, is that there will be a re-
explosion, meaning that matters will not be left with the military 
citing what I call its sacred texts of national interests.  The streets 
will explode again.  And they will explode again, but yet we will 
be confronted with the same negotiated issues.  If you have any 
brilliant solutions for these issues, please let me know so that I can 
use them on my next trip to Egypt, and hope that I emerge alive, or 
at least emerge, unlike my friends. 
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In conclusion, and on a more optimistic note, it is remarkable 
that, in the midst of such a huge military bureaucracy and in the 
presence of all this mythology and the obscurities and ambiguities 
about who holds what power, people continue to go to the streets 
and sacrifice their lives week after week after week.  That to me is 
sheer resolve, and in my view, if anyone has earned the right to 
live in dignity, and with the right to self-determination and liberty, 
it seems like the people of that region have.  They have proven it in 
paying the highest price.  We can no longer speak about “if 
democracy.”  The will for democracy has been demonstrated time 
and time and time again. 
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